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Recent analyses of the possible adverse effects of climate change on agriculture in 
developing countries have raised food security concerns, especially for farm households 
whose crop productivity is expected to fall. The present study uses the GTAP global 
economy-wide model to capture at the same time the expected positive effects on temperate 
zone crop productivity, which will more or less offset the upward pressure on farm product 
prices from yield falls in developing countries. Also modelled is an expected adverse effect 
of higher temperatures and humidity on the productivity of unskilled workers in the tropics, 
but since they work in nonfarm as well as farm activities the net effect of that shock on 
agriculture’s competitiveness is an empirical matter. The results suggest there may be less 
cause for concern over food security than some earlier studies indicated, but the degrees of 
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Following the upward spike in international prices of many primary commodities in 2008, 
and in light of on-going climate changes, policy makers and the general public have once 
again become concerned about global food security. While prices in international markets for 
food and energy raw materials have come down from their mid-2008 peak, they rose again 
for grains in mid-2010 and they remain high by historical standards. More than that, the trend 
in food prices has been noticeably upward over the past decade, in contrast to its trend over 
the 20
th century; and, since the introduction of biofuel subsidies and mandates in the US and 
EU a few years ago, food prices seem to be closely tracking fossil fuel prices – again in 
contrast to the second half of the 20
th century (Figure 1). 
Affluent people in high-income countries can cope with higher prices of farm 
products, but the poorest households of those countries, and a far higher proportion of non-
farm households in developing countries, suffer when food prices are high. Even some farm 
households can be worse off, for example those who produce predominantly cash crops 
whose prices have not risen with those for staple food crops. Food crises can erupt into urban 
riots, as happened in numerous food-deficit developing countries in 2008, and can even bring 
down governments. When followed by natural disasters (as with the earthquake in Haiti in 
2010), the outcome can be catastrophic.  
Climate change is expected to have a non-trivial influence on food security for several 
decades even if global mitigation strategies were to be introduced immediately. It is showing 
up not only in warmer temperatures but also in more-frequent extreme weather events and in 
altered precipitation patterns and thus water availability. The associated crop productivity 
changes may be beneficial in cooler temperate regions in the higher latitudes, but it is widely 
expected to reduce farm land and labour productivity in the tropics – and globally, 
notwithstanding some expected improvements in high latitudes (see, e.g., Cline 2007, 
Mendelsohn 2009, Nelson et al. 2009).  2 
 
What would be the market and economic welfare effects of these expected changes in 
productivity of global agricultural resources? If they were progressively to lower world food 
output, the international food price trend would move onto a higher trajectory, depending on 
how each country and commodity market responded to climate change. Thus it is not 
necessarily the case that most farm families in developing countries are going to be losers 
economically from climate change: it is always possible that the change in the price of their 
output more than compensates for any fall in their farm productivity.  
This paper seeks to provide a sense of how climate change might impact on the 
world’s markets for farm products if there is no mitigation or adaptation other than in 
response to price changes. We make use of the global GTAP model (Hertel 1997) to first 
provide projections of the world economy to 2030 and 2050 without any climate or policy 
changes, and then to compare those baseline numbers with projections which incorporate 
assumed impacts of climate change over the next four decades on farm productivity (based on 
damage function analyses reported in recent studies). Only the two most direct biophysical 
changes are modelled. The first is in crop land productivity, drawing on the interpretation of 
damage functions by Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010). The second relates to the impact of 
higher temperatures and humidity on the productivity of unskilled labour in the already hot 
and humid tropics, drawing on the interpretation of its debilitating effects by van der 
Mensbrugghe and Rosen (2010). The paper concludes by mentioning some caveats and areas 
for further empirical analysis. 
National and global economic welfare effects also are estimated in the GTAP model. 
Their magnitudes are shown to be very small, suggesting that there must be other costs of 
climate change not examined here to warrant the sorts of major policy responses being called 
for (such as carbon emission taxes and border tax adjustments). However, it needs to be kept 
in mind from the outset that we are imposing only a small subset of the shocks expected to 
come from climate change, and we are using a comparative static model that – unlike a 
dynamic stochastic model – cannot capture the sporadic additional costs to farmers and others 
of more-frequent extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts, frosts, hail and wind. 
 
 
Projecting a baseline to 2030 and 2050 with the GTAP model 
 
The standard GTAP model (Hertel 1997) is perhaps the most widely used CGE model for 
economy-wide global market analysis, in part due to its robust and explicit assumptions. In its 3 
 
simplest form, the model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale in 
production. The functional forms are nested constant elasticities of substitution (CES) 
production functions. Land and other natural resources, labour (skilled and unskilled), and 
produced physical capital substitute for one another in a value added aggregate, and 
composite intermediates substitute for value-added at the next CES level in fixed proportions. 
Land is specific to agriculture in the GTAP database, and is allowed to be highly mobile 
amongst alternative agricultural uses over this four-decade projection period. A Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) revenue function transforms land from one use to 
another. The closer the transformation elasticity is to zero, the more unresponsive is land 
supply to changing relative returns to land across agricultural uses. There is also a very low 
elasticity of transformation between alternative uses of natural resources. In the default 
GTAP closure, labour and capital are assumed to be mobile across all uses within a country 
but immobile internationally.  
On the demand side there is a regional representative household whose expenditure is 
governed by Cobb-Douglas aggregate utility function which allocates net national 
expenditures across private, government, and saving activities. The greatest advantage of this 
regional household representation is the unambiguous indicator of economic welfare dictated 
by the regional utility function.
1 Government demand across composite goods is determined 
by a Cobb-Douglas assumption (fixed budget shares). Private household demand is 
represented by a Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) functional form, which has the 
virtue of capturing the non-homothetic nature of private household demands as well as 
permitting the user to calibrate the model to specific own-price elasticities of demand.  
Bilateral international trade flows are handled through the Armington (1969) 
specification by which products are differentiated by country of origin. These Armington 
elasticities are the same across regions but are sector-specific, and the import-import 
elasticities have been estimated at the disaggregated GTAP commodity level (Hertel et al. 
2007). For present purposes, where we are dealing with very long-term changes, we have 
doubled the usual short-to-medium term Armington elasticities for non-primary products and, 
for primary products, we have set them all at the level of the highest one (which was for 
natural gas, at nearly 70). The justification for the latter specification is that over such a long 
                                                 
1 Altering taxes in the GTAP model does not imply a reduction in government revenue and expenditure, as 
government expenditures are not tied to tax revenues. A tax reduction, for example, leads to a reduction in 
excess burden, so regional real income increases and real expenditure – including government expenditure – 
may also rise.  4 
 
period as four decades, primary products will be highly substitutable among different 
countries of origin. 
The standard macro-economic closure assumes that the levels of each region's 
employment of each of the productive factors is fixed in aggregate, and that the regional 
balance of trade is determined by the relationship of regional investment and savings, where 
international capital mobility seeks to equalize expected (but not necessarily actual) rates of  
return across regions. Foreign investment is allocated in fixed shares across regions, so that 
regional investment moves in line with global savings and international capital reallocation is 
excluded. 
The full GTAP 7.0 database comprises 113 regions in addition to the 57 
sectors/product groups, but to make the model more manageable we have aggregated it to 23 
sectors/product groups and 23 regions (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2). It is initially 
calibrated to the year 2004. The standard GTAP protection database (see Narayanan and 
Walmsley 2008) has been altered to include a more-complete set of estimates of distortions to 
agricultural prices in developing countries, based on Valenzuela and Anderson (2008).
2 
Those distortion estimates suggest that, despite reforms of the past 25 years, there was still a 
considerable range of industry assistance rates across commodities and countries in 2004, 
including a strong anti-trade bias in national agricultural and trade policies for many 
developing countries. Furthermore, non-agricultural protectionism is still rife in some 
developing countries, and agricultural price supports in some high-income countries remain 
high.  
To project the world economy to 2030 and 2050, we assume policies as of 2004 and 
the stock of agricultural land do not change in each region but that population, labour, capital 
and real GDP grow at the rates shown in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, from which the 
implied rates of total factor productivity and GDP per capita growth are derived as shown in 
the final two columns of each of those two tables. The exogenous growth rates are based on 
World Bank and OECD projections (see, e.g., Duval and de la Maisonneuve 2009). The rate 
of total factor productivity growth is assumed to be the same in each of the non-primary 
sectors, and to be somewhat higher in the primary sectors as detailed in the footnotes to 
Appendix Tables A3 and A4. Those higher rates are set so as to ensure the price of primary 
products in 2030 and 2050 (relative to the aggregate change for all products, shown in 
                                                 
2 That distortions database is documented fully in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and is based on the 
methodology summarized in Anderson et al. (2008).  5 
 
Appendix Table A5) are little different from those in 2004, and to be consistent with World 
Bank projections over the next four decades. Agricultural prices could have been made to fall 
by assuming faster productivity growth in the farm sector than in other sectors – as occurred 
in the past half century (Martin and Mitra 2001), and as projected in GTAP-based projection 
studies in the late 20
th century (e.g., Anderson et al. 1997) – but that is considered less likely 
for the next four decades given the slowdown in agricultural R&D investment and its 
consequent slowing of farm productivity growth since 1990 (Alston, Babcock and Pardey 
2010). 
Given the differences across regions in those growth rates, and the fact that sectors 
differ in their relative factor intensities, the structures of production, consumption and trade 
across sectors within countries and also between countries is going to be different in 2030 
and 2050 than in 2004. In particular, the developing countries (especially those of Asia) will 
become a considerably larger share of the projected global economy over the next four 
decades. In the baseline projection the developing countries’ share of world GDP rises from 
22 percent in 2004 to 26 percent in 2030 and 47 percent in 2050—with China’s share alone 
growing from 4 to 17 percent (Appendix Table A6). The developing countries will also see 
the share of agriculture in their GDP decline, from 10 to 6 percent for that grouping as a 
whole (Appendix Table A7). As a consequence of these two changes, the developing 
countries’ share of global agricultural GDP rises slightly, from 50 percent in 2004 to a 
projected 56 percent by 2050 (Appendix Table A8). 
 
 
Alternative scenarios for 2030 and 2050 
 
Given the baseline projections summarized above, we then use the GTAP model to simulate  
the market and welfare effects first of the direct impact of climate change on crop yields in 
different parts of the world, and then also of the projected impacts of climate change on 
unskilled labour productivity in developing countries.  
 
Crop productivity effects 
 
The direct impacts of climate change on crop productivity have been examined by many 
analysts, and there still remains considerable uncertainty as to even their sign let alone their 6 
 
magnitude. Nonetheless, for present purposes we adopt the same rates for the period from 
2004 to 2030 as the medial rates used by Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010),
3 with a few minor 
adjustments, such as for Australia so as to be more consistent with the 2008 Garnaut Review 
(see also Gunasekera et al. 2007). Those yield shocks are summarized in Table 1. Given that 
climate change is expected to accelerate after the first one-third of this decade, we then 
assume those impacts on crop yields in the first 26 years will be twice as large two decades 
later, in 2050.  
Two points are worth noting about those shocks. First, those shock are generally 
positive for high-income temperate countries except for rice, coarse grains (i.e. maize) and 
cotton (and, in Australia’s case, for fruits and vegetables whose yields are expected to suffer 
because of a shrinkage in water availability), while they are generally negative for developing 
countries (with China and the Middle East/North Africa region being the main exceptions). 
And second, those yield shocks are very small over a period as long as four decades, when 
compared with the annual productivity growth rates reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4. 
More than that, farm land is projected to account throughout the next four decades for less 
than one-tenth of GDP in even the most agrarian of developing economies and to be below 1 
percent in some high-income countries (Appendix Table A9). Hence the net economic effects 
of these direct crop yield impacts of climate change will necessarily be small in proportional 
terms – even though they may have large impacts on very seriously affected regions within 
some countries, such as the hot irrigated horticultural and rice- and cotton-growing regions of 
Australia and the United States.  
  The effects of those climate changed-induced direct crop productivity impacts on 
national agricultural self sufficiency for the sector as a whole in 2030 and 2050, as compared 
with the baseline in those years, are very small (barely 1 percent, see Table 2. Some of the 
effects on the production, consumption and trade components of those self sufficiency ratios, 
summarized in percentage terms in Tables 3 and 4 for 2030 and 2050, are somewhat larger 
than the effects on self sufficiency, but are still small overall. The projected volume of 
agricultural output would shrink by no more than 5 percent in any of the developing countries 
shown in those tables (but would rise in very few of them).  
Typically the farmgate price of products is projected to move in the opposite direction 
to farm production in response to these yield shocks though. Hence agricultural value added 
                                                 
3 Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010) acknowledge the wide confidence band around that median effect by also 
noting the 5 and 95 percentile effects, and showing the wide difference that makes to the economic and poverty 
effects generated by their economywide model. 7 
 
(which also takes account of changes in input prices such as animal feedstuffs) sometimes 
shows the opposite sign to the volume of farm output (column 4 of Tables 3(a) and 3(b)). In 
particular, agricultural value added rises in all but a few developing countries. 
Note from the top of Tables 3(a) and 3(b) that the aggregate price of agricultural 
products in international markets in 2030 and 2050 changes hardly at all as a result of the 
productivity shocks (less than 0.3 percent). It even happens to be slightly negative, rather 
than positive as predicted by numerous commentators, which means the mainly adverse 
effects on farm supplies in developing countries is slightly offset by the mainly positive 
effects on farm output in high-income countries. 
Consumption volumes are affected little by this one impact of climate change, but 
typically in the same direction as the production change. As a result, the value of agricultural 
trade changes very little. In the case of high-income countries, exports would be just 1.2 
percent higher and those countries’ farm imports would be 0.8 percent less in 2030 because 
of the assumed crop productivity impacts of climate change. The percentage changes for 
developing countries as a group would be slightly larger and of the opposite signs to those for 
high-income countries (bottom two rows of Table 3). Thus the developing country share of 
global exports (imports) of farm products would fall (rise). 
The impact of those price and quantity changes on overall national economic welfare 
is summarized in Table 4. For the world as a whole, the negative impact seems very small, at 
around $4 billion per year by 2030 and just $3 billion by 2050 – a small fraction of 1 percent 
of projected real income. That aggregate conceals larger proportional changes at the country 
level, especially for developing countries, but even so they appear to be very minor (final 
column of Table 4). Those national economic welfare effects are shown in that table to come 
not only from (a) the factor productivity shocks themselves but also from (b) the impact of 
producer and consumer responses to them on the welfare costs of distortionary policies such 
as tariffs and subsidies and (c) the change in the country’s international terms of trade. Note 
that the latter two indirect effects are non-trivial, and in some countries they are larger than 
the direct productivity effect. Also, the third effect (via changes in the terms of trade) in some 
cases is quite different by 2050 than in 2030. This is partly because the international prices 
for the myriad products, and their traded quantities, are affected to different extents by the 
productivity shocks. Particularly striking examples are China and India: in 2030 the terms of 
trade changes reduce slightly their national welfare, whereas by 2050 their welfare is 
enhanced considerably by the terms of trade changes (c.f. Tables 3(a) and 3(b)). 8 
 
These projected changes from the assumed crop productivity effects of climate 
change are but one of the influences expected from temperature and humidity changes over 
coming decades. We turn now to an additional expected influence, namely via its debilitating 
impact on unskilled workers in developing countries which van der Mensbrugghe and Rosen 
(2010) indicated could be far more important. 
 
Effects also on unskilled labour productivity 
 
Almost all unskilled labourers in tropical developing countries have no access to air 
conditioning in their workplace, especially as most work outside on farms. Since 
temperatures and humidity are expected to rise from already very high levels in most of those 
countries, the productivity of such workers is sure to fall in the absence of counter measures. 
By contrast, in high-income countries the temperature rises generally will be from cool or at 
most moderate rather than high current levels, and in any case many unskilled workers there 
work inside with air conditioning. 
  We follow van der Mensbrugghe and Rosen (2010) in attempting to simulate the 
effect of climate change on all unskilled workers in tropical and desertified developing 
countries, by adding to the crop yield shock a shock to unskilled labour productivity in both 
agricultural and non-farm sectors. There are no precise predictions of the likely magnitude of 
that shock, so we simply adopt the modest assumption that it involves a 3 percent decline in 
unskilled labour productivity by 2030 and another 3 percent by 2050 in all developing 
countries other than the relatively temperate ones of Argentina, Korea, South Africa and 
Taiwan and the most affluent ones (Hong Kong and Singapore). 
The effects of adding this additional shock on agricultural markets is summarized in 
Table 5. For developing countries as a group the generally negative impact of the two shocks 
on the volume of agricultural production is roughly double or more the effect of the crop 
productivity shock alone. But there is an even larger difference in the decline in consumption 
of farm products, so the impact on trade is muted. The developing country share of global 
exports (imports) of farm products would still be higher (lower) by 2050 than in the absence 
of the productivity shocks, but the change would be less than if only crop productivity was 
affected (c.f. the bottom right-hand corners of Tables 3 and 5). The main exception is China, 
whose value of agricultural exports diminishes by nearly twice as much with this pair of 
shocks as with just the crop shock. This is because most of its unskilled labour is employed in 9 
 
agriculture by 2050, so most of the brunt of the labour productivity shock is borne by farming 
which makes the non-farm sector more competitive. 
The welfare affects are now far bigger than in the previous scenario, because the 
shock to unskilled labour applies to all sectors of developing countries, not just to agriculture. 
Even so they amount to no more than one-quarter of one percent of real income globally and  





The above analysis is very partial in nature, in several respects. First, it examines the effects 
of just two of the many impacts that climate changes are expected to have on the global 
economy. van der Mensbrugghe and Rosen (2010), for example, also take into account the 
effects on energy demand, water availability, tourism and sea level rise. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, they get a much higher impact of climate change on global economic welfare – 
indeed twice as big, and of opposite sign, as the welfare effect of freeing trade policies 
globally in 2050 (-1.8 percent, compared with 0.9 percent from freeing trade). 
  Second, we have only analysed the effects to 2050. The effects of climate change are 
expected to increase exponentially, however, so in the absence of mitigation they would be 
much larger in the second half of the 21
st century. This is supported by the dynamic 
simulations to 2100 generated by Rosen and van der Mensbrugghe (2010).  
Third, the nature of each simulated shock obviously determines the size of its effects. 
The crop productivity shocks we adopt, like most other analysts’, help farm output in higher 
latitudes and hurt it in many parts of the tropics. The net effect in our case is virtually no 
aggregate global agricultural output change (see last row of Table 3). By contrast, van der 
Mensbrugghe and Rosen (2010) assume larger positive shocks in temperate regions and 
smaller negative shocks in the tropics and so project a small net global economic welfare gain 
from the changes in crop productivity. They also adopt a damage function approach to the 
effect of temperature rise on labour productivity (based on such studies as Kjellstrom et al. 
2009), in contrast to our simple exogenous labour shock. More sophisticated damage 
functions with respect to crop productivity also could be adopted, especially now that the 
GTAP database is being enhanced to enable better modelling of land use changes  (see Hertel 
2010) and the impact of changes in water availability in irrigated versus non-irrigated areas 
(see Calzadilla et al. 2010). Given the great uncertainty associated with the magnitude – and 10 
 
in some cases even the sign of – potential shocks, analytical results ideally should include 
confidence bands around them or at least high and low alternatives to the median case 
presented. 
Fourth, the standard version of the GTAP model used in the present study does not 
capture the complexity of energy markets. In particular, there are no biofuels markets, so the 
linkage that has recently emerged between biofuel crops and fossil fuels is not built into the 
projections. Modellers have certainly begun incorporating elements of that linkage, but even 
then there will be the challenge of anticipating how governments might alter biofuel subsidies 
and mandates over the next 40 years (given the newness of many of those policies and the 
uncertainty still surrounding the net environmental benefits of such supports to biofuel 
producers).   
Fifth, as mentioned at the outset of this paper, the debilitating impact on welfare and 
food security from extreme weather events is not captured by the comparative static model 
we have employed. More-frequent extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, frosts, 
hail and wind can affect all sectors but are especially damaging to farm incomes whenever 
they strike. Analysis of the welfare effects of climate change ought to recognise these income 
distributional consequences, particularly on the poor. Economy-wide modellers are only now 
beginning to focus on those possible poverty consequences (see, e.g., Hertel, Burke and 
Lobell 2010). 
And finally, we have assumed throughout that policies are unchanged through the 
projection period, and in particular that no new mitigation strategies or technologies are 
adopted to slow climate change, nor are trade, subsidy or tax policies changed. This is an 
obvious area for extending the analysis. If a carbon tax was gradually phased in by all 
countries, for example, climate change presumably would eventually slow down. However, it 
probably would not before 2050, and meanwhile that set of carbon taxes would alter the 
international competitiveness of various industries around the world. Carbon-intensive 
industrial sectors such as China’s would be likely to lose comparative advantage, thereby 
making China’s farmers more competitive. And China might not be able to avoid that 
outcome simply by not adopting a carbon tax, because in that case other countries that have 
adopted such a tax may impose border tax adjustments on goods imported from China 





Given the above caveats, it would of course be premature to draw implications for 
agricultural, trade and climate change policies from the empirical results presented in this 
paper. They are presented simply to illustrate some of the ways in which one or two of the 
shocks expected from on-going climate change can affect agricultural markets directly or 
indirectly, and thereby also economic welfare. When those effects are expected to be positive 
in some countries and negative in others, as in the case of farm products, the net impact on 
world food prices and hence real incomes of both farm and nonfarm households in the 
decades ahead can only be determined with the use of a global economy-wide model 
projected forward. 
  For what it is worth, in terms of global food security the results from the present 
analysis are less pessimistic than some earlier studies. One of the more widely cited is by 
Cline (2007), who predicts that by the 2080s, even with carbon fertilization, agricultural 
output will be 8 percent lower in developing countries, 8 percent higher in high-income 
countries, and 3 percent lower globally. Projections in a more recent study by Nelson et al. 
(2009) suggest that by 2050 climate change will have had, assuming no carbon fertilization, 
only a little downward impact on coarse grain production but will have reduced global rice 
production by one-eighth and wheat by one-quarter globally and nearly one-third in 
developing countries. Nelson et al. (2009) expect real international prices of grain and 
livestock in 2050 would be between 35 and 70 percent higher than in 2000 without climate 
change and more than 10 percentage points higher again with climate change, even with 
carbon fertilization. If those rather than the present study’s results turn out to be closer to 
reality, food security concerns and associated policy responses such as expanding agricultural 
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Table 1: Exogenous Yield Shocks (%) attributed to Climate Change in 2030, by region and 
sector 
Regions 








USA -3  2  3  2  2  -3  2 
Canada -3  7  -10  2  10  -3  2 
EU27 and EFTA  7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Russia 7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Australia -3  7  -5  -3  2  -3  7 
New Zealand  7  7  -5  7  2  7  7 
Japan 9  4  0  4  9  9  4 
Korea 12  12  5  12  12  12  12 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan 12 12  5  -3  12  12 12 
China 0  2  -10  -8  0  0  -8 
Indonesia   -3  -3  -10  7  -3  -3  -3 
Malaysia -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Thailand -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Rest of East Asia  -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
India -5  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Rest of South Asia  -5  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Argentina -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Brazil -3  -3  -10  -3  2  -3  -3 
Rest of Latin America  -3  -3  -5  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Middle East/Nth Africa  2  2  -5  2  2  2  2 
South Africa  -8  -8  -20  -8  -8  -8  -8 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
 
Source: Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010) 
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Table 2: Effects of economic growth, and of crop yield changes due to climate change, on 




















USA  103.4 130.2 130.3  130.2 152.3 152.2  152.3 
Canada  108.3 125.4 125.1  125.0 125.3 125.2  125.3 
EU27 and EFTA  94.0 114.4 115.6  115.6 123.5 124.3  124.3 
Russia  89.2 94.5 94.8  94.9 94.6 95.0  95.3 
Rest of EE/C Asia  100.2 106.6 107.7  107.6 120.7 121.7  121.7 
Australia  137.9 164.3 164.3  164.5 186.2 186.7  187.2 
New Zealand  161.2 187.4 189.0  188.9 207.5 206.0  206.3 
Japan  82.5  96.8  97.7  97.6 114.0 114.2  114.5 
Korea  81.4 83.6 86.6  86.5 88.9 91.0  90.9 
HK/Sing/Taiwan  65.9 67.4 67.9  67.9 59.2 59.4  59.4 
China  97.2 46.3 45.5  45.3 26.2 25.9  25.5 
Indonesia   94.7 74.1 73.8  73.8 63.6 63.2  63.1 
Malaysia  60.3 37.3 37.0  37.0 26.9 26.7  26.7 
Thailand  111.9 98.0 97.0  96.9 97.4 97.0  96.7 
Rest of East Asia  99.5 82.3 81.4  81.4 75.4 74.5  74.6 
India  101.2 89.4 88.5  88.4 94.5 94.1  94.0 
Rest of Sth. Asia  95.7 81.8 81.2  81.3 74.9 74.4  74.4 
Argentina  142 153.2 150.0  149.6 171.5 168.3  167.6 
Brazil  122.5 141.6 141.1  141.4 157.6 157.0  157.4 
Rest of L America  101.7 93.2 92.5  92.5 90.5 89.5  89.6 
M. East/N. Africa  83.6 86.7 86.8  86.6 92.2 92.3  92.0 
South Africa  106.9 140.8 136.2  136.2 166.9 161.9  162.0 
Rest of SS Africa  102.2  96.0  94.9  94.7 104.2 103.3  103.1 
High-income 
countries  96.1 118.3 116.8  116.8 261.4 131.3  131.4 
Developing 




Source: Authors’ simulations, assuming the crop productivity shocks of climate change are 
those shown in Table 1 by 2030 and twice those by 2050. 18 
 
Table 3: Effects of crop productivity shocks due to climate change on agricultural production, 
consumption and trade, 2030 and 2050  
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA 0.0  0.0 -0.1 0.0  0.1  -0.7 
Canada 0.4  -0.5 -0.2 -0.4  -0.1 0.0 
EU27 and EFTA  -0.9  1.4 0.3 0.7  2.0  -1.0 
Russia -0.3  0.5 0.2 -0.1 1.3  -1.0 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -1.0  1.4 0.3 0.4  3.2  -1.0 
Australia 0.3  -0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.4 0.4 
New Zealand  -0.4  1.0 0.1 -0.2 1.0  -0.9 
Japan -1.1  1.1 0.2 0.8  2.8  -0.7 
Korea -2.6  4.6 1.0 -1.4 7.2  -2.9 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan -0.2  1.0 0.2 -0.4 2.1  -0.1 
China 1.6  -1.8 -0.1 -0.5  -0.7 0.9 
Indonesia   0.9  -0.7 -0.2 -0.3  -1.6 0.8 
Malaysia 0.5  -0.9 -0.1 0.6  -2.5  0.2 
Thailand 0.9  -1.1 -0.1 0.2  -1.5  1.1 
Rest of East Asia  0.6  -1.3 -0.2 0.8  -2.7  0.8 
India 2.3  -1.5 -0.5 -1.5  -1.0 2.5 
Rest of South Asia  1.1  -1.0 -0.2 -0.5  -1.0 2.5 
Argentina 1.1  -1.9 0.2 0.2  -3.3  1.0 
Brazil 0.3  -0.7 -0.3 0.2  -1.4  1.5 
Rest of Latin America  0.6  -1.0 -0.2 0.2  -3.6  1.0 
Middle East/Nth Africa  -0.6  0.3 0.1  0.8 -0.4 -0.4 
South Africa  1.8  -3.5 -0.2 -0.1  -5.9 0.9 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  1.9  -1.5 -0.4 -0.8  -4.1 2.0 
High-income countries  -0.5  0.7 0.2 0.3  1.2  -0.8 
Developing countries  1.1  -1.0 -0.2 -0.5  -1.5 0.9 
World 0.2  0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.4 19 
 
Table 3 (continued): Effects of crop productivity shocks due to climate change on agricultural 
production, consumption and trade, 2030 and 2050 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA  -0.2  0.0 0.1 0.5  -0.3  -1.1 
Canada  0.9  -1.7 -1.6 -0.5  -1.2  -0.4 
EU27 and EFTA  -1.7  2.3 1.6 1.3 1.6 -0.9
Russia  -0.6  0.8 0.3 0.0  1.1  -0.6 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -1.9  2.3 1.4 1.2  1.7  -1.1 
Australia  0.2  -0.1 -0.4  0.1 0.1  -0.1 
New Zealand  -0.9  1.3 2.0 0.7  0.4  -0.9 
Japan  -1.9  1.7 1.5 1.5  0.2  -0.7 
Korea  -2.2  3.9 1.5  -1.5  4.2  -1.0 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -0.7  0.7 0.3 1.4  -0.4  -0.3 
China  1.1  -1.9 -0.5  0.7  -7.3 0.0 
Indonesia   0.9  -0.9 -0.3  0.0  -4.2 0.5 
Malasya  -0.1  -0.9 -0.4  1.9  -4.9  -0.5 
Thailand  0.1  -0.8 -0.3  1.5  -1.2 0.0 
Rest of East Asia  -0.2  -1.3 -0.1  2.4  -4.4  -0.2 
India  1.6  -1.2 -0.8 -1.0  -0.3 0.7 
Rest of South Asia  1.1  -1.3 -0.6 -0.1  -1.5 0.3 
Argentina  1.0  -2.5 -0.7  1.1  -4.1 0.1 
Brazil  0.4  -0.9 -0.5  0.4  -1.0 3.2 
Rest of Latin America  0.2  -1.3 -0.2  1.4  -4.9 0.3 
Middle East/Nth Africa  -1.3  0.6 0.5 2.0  -1.2  -1.1 
South Africa  2.1  -5.5 -2.6  1.9  -7.6 0.0 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  1.6  -1.5 -0.6 -0.4  -1.3 2.1 
High-income countries  -0.9  0.7 0.8 0.9  0.6  -0.9 
Developing countries  0.7  -1.0 -0.4  0.3  -1.3 0.1 
World  -0.1  0.0 0.0 0.5  -0.1  -0.1 
 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations, assuming that climate change involves twice the crop 




Table 4: Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses, 2030 and 2050 
 
(2004 US$ million, deviation from baseline in projected year) 
(a) 2030 















as % of 
Income 
USA  245 697  226 1166 0.01
Canada  30 229  -81  178 0.01
EU27 and EFTA  3270 -1091  -363  1815  0.01
Russia  194 71  46 310  0.03
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  839 -31  310  1119 0.09
Australia  -86 356  36  306 0.03
New Zealand  89 -94  2  -4 0.00
Japan  675 -97  -265 313 0.01
Korea  1110 -226  -989  -106 -0.01
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  46 67  -9 104  0.01
China  -2954 -885  1372 -2467 -0.04
Indonesia   -220 45  12  -163  -0.03
Malaysia  -36 10  26  0  0.00
Thailand  -241 33  64  -144  -0.04
Rest of East Asia  -311 64  2  -246  -0.06
India  -4076 -225  479 -3821 -0.23
Rest of South Asia  -690 153  51 -486 -0.11
Argentina  -229 277  -197 -149 -0.06
Brazil  -354 -105  -35  -494 -0.05
Rest of Latin America  -1055 37  379  -639  -0.02
Middle East/Nth Africa  248 265  62  573 0.03
South Africa  -360 325  -20  -54 -0.02
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -1267 128  21  -1118 -0.17
High-income countries  5256 40  -89  5203  0.01
Developing countries  -10389 -37 1218  -9210  -0.05
World  -5134 1  1127  -4006  -0.01
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Table 4 (continued): Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses, 2030 
and 2050  
 
(2004 US$ million, deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 
(b) 2050  















as % of 
Income 
USA  582 -1818  95  -1141  -0.01
Canada  -141 940 -212  586  0.03
EU27 and EFTA  7854 -7626  -1720  -1493  -0.01
Russia  303 241  108  652  0.04
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  2067 -1716  686  1037  0.05
Australia  -269 489  43  262  0.02
New Zealand  220 -404  -17  -202  -0.09
Japan  1222 -2009  -637  -1423  -0.03
Korea  1791 -1062  -1092  -364  -0.01
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  46 -123  5  -73  0.00
China  -2239 6547  1648  5957  0.05
Indonesia   -421 134  -3 -290  -0.03
Malaysia  -58 107  44  93  0.02
Thailand  -299 23 182 -95 -0.01
Rest of East Asia  -487 20 -19  -486 -0.07
India  -6609 2929  923 -2757  -0.09
Rest of South Asia  -1228 1034  109  -84  -0.01
Argentina  -494 495 -421 -420  -0.11
Brazil  -842 -28  -79  -949 -0.06
Rest of Latin America  -1941 109  643  -1189  -0.03
Middle East/Nth Africa  666 436  180  1282  0.04
South Africa  -976 598  -90 -468  -0.09
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -2470 692  245  -1533  -0.13
High-income countries  11838 -11903  -1654  -1722  0.00
Developing countries  -15561 11911  2275  -1376  0.00
World  -3723 7  621  -3095  0.00
 
Source: authors’ simulations 22 
 
Table 5: Effects on agricultural production, consumption and trade of crop productivity losses 
and decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050 
 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA  0.1  -0.1 -0.1  0.1 -0.1  -0.7 
Canada  0.5  -0.7 -0.4  -0.2 -0.4  0.0 
EU27 and EFTA  -0.8  1.3 0.3  0.6 1.9  -1.0 
Russia  -0.3  0.5 0.0  -0.2 1.7  -1.2 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -0.9  1.2 0.2  0.4 2.7  -0.9 
Australia  0.3  0.2 0.1  -0.6 0.8  0.1 
New Zealand  -0.3  0.9 0.1  -0.1 0.9  -0.8 
Japan  -1.0  1.0 0.2  0.8 2.5  -0.6 
Korea  -2.4  4.5 1.1  -1.5 6.9  -2.8 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -0.1  0.9 0.3  -0.4 2.0  0.0 
China  2.4  -3.0 -1.0  -0.2 -3.1  0.6 
Indonesia   1.1  -1.5 -1.0  0.4 -2.4  0.1 
Malaysia  0.5  -1.7 -1.0  1.4 -2.1  -0.6 
Thailand  1.0  -1.3 -0.2  0.2 -1.9  1.2 
Rest of East Asia  0.8  -2.1 -0.9  1.3 -3.0  0.4 
India  2.6  -2.4 -1.2  -1.0 -2.6  1.8 
Rest of South Asia  1.4  -1.6 -1.0  -0.1 -1.2  0.3 
Argentina  1.0 -2.0  0.4  0.4  -3.9  0.9 
Brazil  0.3  -0.9 -0.8  0.7 -1.2  0.6 
Rest of Latin America  0.9  -1.8 -1.0  0.7 -4.0  0.5 
Middle East/Nth Africa  -0.2  -0.8 -0.6  1.2 -1.7  -0.5 
South Africa  1.9  -3.5 -0.3  -0.1 -6.0  0.7 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  -2.7 -1.4  -0.1 -5.8  1.7 
High-income countries  -0.5  0.7 0.1  0.3 1.1  -0.9 
Developing countries  1.1  -1.8 -0.9  -0.1 -2.2  0.5 
World  0.2 -0.4  -0.4  0.1  0.2  0.1 Table 5 (continued): Effects of on agricultural production, consumption and trade of crop 
productivity losses and decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050 
 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 




















USA  -0.1 0.2  0.1  0.3  0.0  -1.4 
Canada  1.1 -1.7  -1.7  -0.7  -1.1  -0.5 
EU27 and EFTA  -1.6 2.4  1.7  1.3  1.6  -1.0 
Russia  -0.7 1.2  0.4  -0.3  1.9  -0.7 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -1.7 2.3  1.4  1.1  1.6  -1.2 
Australia  0.0 0.6  0.1  -0.4  1.0  -0.9 
New Zealand  -0.8 1.2  1.8  0.6  0.5  -1.0 
Japan  -1.9 2.0  1.5  1.1  0.6  -1.0 
Korea  -1.9 3.8  1.5  -1.7  4.3  -0.8 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -0.5 0.6  0.3  1.3  -0.3  -0.2 
China  2.6 -3.6  -0.8  0.5  -13.6 0.2 
Indonesia   1.0 -1.7  -1.0  0.6  -4.5  -0.1 
Malaysia  0.1 -1.6  -1.1  2.7  -4.6  -1.1 
Thailand  0.4 -1.3  -0.6  1.7  -1.8 0.1 
Rest of East Asia  0.1 -2.0  -0.9  2.7  -4.3  -0.7 
India  2.3 -2.3  -1.7  -0.9  -1.1 0.2 
Rest of South Asia  1.5 -1.9  -1.2  0.2  -1.6  -0.1 
Argentina  1.0 -2.5  -0.3  1.2  -4.6 0.2 
Brazil  0.4 -1.1  -1.0  0.7  -0.9 2.4 
Rest of Latin America  0.5 -1.9  -1.0  1.8  -4.9  -0.2 
Middle East/Nth Africa  -0.9 -0.4  -0.2  2.5  -2.2  -1.4 
South Africa  2.0 -5.5  -2.6  1.9  -7.6  -0.6 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  1.9 -2.7  -1.7  0.5  -2.7 1.4 
High-income countries  -0.5 0.6  0.8  0.7  0.8  -1.1 
Developing countries  1.1 -2.9  -0.9  0.5  -1.9 0.1 
World  0.2 -0.5  -0.3  0.6  -0.2  -0.2 
 
Source: authors’ simulations 2 
 
Table 6: Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses and decreases in 
unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050   
 




















USA  244 -1227  -45  -1028  -0.01
Canada  30 -439  -130  -539  -0.04
EU27 and EFTA  3262  -3387  -784  -910  -0.01
Russia  194 -2443  -441  -2690  -0.26
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  836 -994  255  97  0.01
Australia  -86 -1170  -92  -1347  -0.12
New Zealand  89 -116  -7  -34  -0.02
Japan  674 109 -300  482  0.01
Korea  1108 578  -1029  657  0.04
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  45 165  14  224  0.02
China  -42915 12165  -7571 -38321  -0.69
Indonesia   -5029 -298  -231 -5558  -0.93
Malaysia  -2912 347 -117  -2682  -0.87
Thailand  -240 337  76  174  0.05
Rest of East Asia  -3139 -30 -385  -3554  -0.89
India  -17432 2232  -928  -16127  -0.96
Rest of South Asia  -4410 591 -322  -4142  -0.95
Argentina  -228 115 -212 -325  -0.13
Brazil  -9560 -314 -1412  -11286  -1.04
Rest of Latin America  -15544 -921 -6728  -23192  -0.90
Middle East/Nth Africa  -10224 -3966  -1335 -15524  -0.77
South Africa  -359 -102  -63  -524  -0.15
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -6292  -1247  -610  -8150  -1.23
High-income countries  5243 -9667  -1544  -5969  -0.01
Developing countries  -117131 9652  -20853  -128330  -0.67
World  -111888 -16  -22395  -134298  -0.22
 
Source: authors’ simulations 
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Table 6 (continued): Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses and 
decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050  
 


















as % of 
Income 
USA  583 -21726  -2153  -23296  -0.11
Canada  -143 -1939  -654  -2736  -0.15
EU27 and EFTA  7831  -22858  -5836  -20863  -0.12
Russia  305 -6438  -746  -6879  -0.46
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  2060 -4961  469  -2432  -0.13
Australia  -272 -5708  -637  -6617  -0.39
New Zealand  220 -509  -61  -350  -0.15
Japan  1230 -7574 -1275  -7618  -0.14
Korea  1787 1718  -1154  2351  0.09
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  45 365  46  456  0.02
China  -66560 69422  -12935 -10073  -0.09
Indonesia   -8242 -1101  -431  -9775  -0.89
Malaysia  -4893 1041  -229 -4080  -0.72
Thailand  -298 764 227  692  0.11
Rest of East Asia  -4920 -391 -668 -5979  -0.86
India  -28586 11354  -779 -18011  -0.58
Rest of South Asia  -7295 2025  -525 -5795  -0.74
Argentina  -493 125  -476 -845  -0.22
Brazil  -14365 -679  -2053  -17097  -1.00
Rest of Latin America  -22981 -2410  -10037 -35427  -0.88
Middle East/Nth Africa  -15376 -7564 -2043 -24983  -0.73
South Africa  -975 -1082  -267  -2323  -0.44
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -10365  -2123  -831  -13318  -1.17
High-income countries  11814 -71713 -10893  -70791  -0.14
Developing countries  -183517 71464  -32155  -144207  -0.42
World  -171704 -245  -43049  -214998  -0.25
 
Source: authors’ simulations 4 
 
Appendix Table A1: Aggregations of regions in the GTAP model 
 
Regions-Aggregation  Comprising GTAP regions 
1  USA  United States of America; Rest of North America 
2 Canada  Canada 
3  EU27 and EFTA  Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; 
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; 
Sweden; United Kingdom; Switzerland; Norway; Rest of 
EFTA; Bulgaria; Romania 
4 Russia  Russian  Federation 
5  Rest of E. Europe/C. 
Asia 
Albania; Belarus; Croatia; Ukraine; Rest of Eastern 
Europe; Rest of Europe; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyztan; Rest of 
Former Soviet Union; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Iran 
Islamic Republic of; Turkey 
6 Australia  Australia 
7  New Zealand  New Zealand 
8 Japan  Japan 
9 Korea  Korea 
10 Hong  Kong,  Singapore, 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong; Taiwan; Singapore 
11 China  China 
12 Indonesia  Indonesia 
13 Malaysia  Malaysia 
14 Thailand  Thailand 
15  Rest of East Asia  Cambodia; Lao People's Democratic Republ; Myanmar; 
Philippines; Viet Nam; Rest of Southeast Asia, Rest of 
Oceania; Rest of East Asia 
16 India  India 
17  Rest of South Asia  Bangladesh; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia 
18 Argentina  Argentina 
19 Brazil  Brazil 
20  Rest of Latin America  Mexico; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Paraguay; 
Peru; Uruguay; Venezuela; Rest of South America; Costa 
Rica; Guatemala; Nicaragua; Panama; Rest of Central 
America; Caribbean 
21 Middle  East/North 
Africa 
Rest of Western Asia; Egypt; Morocco; Tunisia; Rest of 
North Africa 
22  South Africa  South Africa 
23 Rest  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Nigeria; Senegal; Rest of Western Africa; Central Africa; 
South Central Africa; Ethiopia; Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mauritius; Mozambique; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe; Rest of Eastern Africa; Botswana;; Rest of 
South African Customs  
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from www.gtap.org 
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Appendix Table A2: Aggregations of sectors in the GTAP model 
 
  Sectors-Aggregation  Comprising GTAP sectors 
1  Rice  Paddy rice; Processed rice 
2  Wheat Wheat 
3  Coarse grains  Cereal grains nec 
4  Fruit & veg  Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
5  Oilseeds  Oil seeds, Vegetable oils and fats 
6  Sugar  Sugar cane, sugar beet; Sugar 
7  Cotton Plant-based  fibers 
8  Other crops  Crops nec 
9  Beef/sheep  Cattle,sheep,goats,horses; Meat of cattle, sheep, 
goats, horses; Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
10  Pork/chicken  Animal products nec; Meat products nec 
11  Dairy Raw  milk;  Dairy  products 
12  Forestry Forestry 
13  Coal Coal 
14  Oil Oil 
15  Gas Gas 
16  Minerals nec  Minerals nec 
17  Fish and processed 
food 
Fishing; Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco 
products 
18  Light manufacturing  Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather products, Wood 
products; Paper products, publishing; Metal 
products; Motor vehicles and parts; Transport 
equipment nec; Manufactures nec 
19  Heavy manufacturing  Petroleum, coal products; Chemical,rubber,plastic 
prods; Mineral products nec; Ferrous metals; Metals 
nec; Electronic equipment; Machinery and 
equipment nec 
20 Utilities  & 
Construction 
Water; Construction; Trade 
21  Electricity Gas dist.  Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution 
22  Transport   Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport 
23  Other Services  Communication; Financial services nec; Insurance; 




Source: Authors’ compilation from www.gtap.org 6 
 
Appendix Table A3: Assumed annual rates of growth in factor endowments and real GDP, 
and implied total factor productivity and real GDP per capita growth rates, from 2004 to 2030 

















USA  0.7 0.8  -0.2  3.2  2.6  1.4  1.9 
Canada  0.4 0.4  -0.6  3.1  2.6  1.2  2.3 
EU27 and EFTA  -0.1 0.0  -0.7  1.9  1.9  1.2  2.0 
Russia  -0.6 -0.7  -1.0  3.2  3.2  1.2  3.8 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  0.6 0.7  1.4  3.9  4.0  1.2  3.5 
Australia  0.6 0.8  -0.2  3.7  3.4  1.5  2.8 
New Zealand  0.7 1.0  0.0  3.6  3.4  1.2  2.7 
Japan  -0.3 -0.7  -1.4  2.3  1.4  1.0  1.7 
Korea  0.3 -0.4  2.0  4.9  4.7  1.9  4.4 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  0.4 0.2  0.6  4.9  4.5  1.8  4.1 
China  0.6 0.5  5.0  9.5  6.9  1.2  6.3 
Indonesia   1.1 1.3  3.7  4.8  5.1  1.6  4.0 
Malaysia  1.3 1.5  5.0  5.7  5.7  1.6  4.4 
Thailand  0.5 0.1  2.0  4.0  4.7  1.7  4.2 
Rest of East Asia  1.2 1.5  2.9  4.1  4.4  1.2  3.2 
India  1.1 1.5  3.0  5.9  5.7  1.8  4.6 
Rest of South Asia  1.7 2.2  3.1  5.0  5.1  1.4  3.4 
Argentina  0.9 0.3  2.9  2.7  3.4  1.5  2.5 
Brazil  1.0 0.9  2.3  3.3  3.6  1.3  2.6 
Rest of Latin America  1.3 1.6  2.9  3.5  3.9  1.0  2.6 
Middle East/Nth Africa  1.6 2.0  2.4  4.1  4.6  1.0  2.9 
South Africa  0.4 0.7  0.5  1.9  3.3  1.8  2.9 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  2.0 2.5  2.4  3.8  4.5  1.0  2.5 
High-income countries  0.2 0.2  -0.5  2.6  2.2  1.2  2.0 
Developing countries  1.2 1.4  2.9  5.9  5.1  1.3  3.9 
World  1.0 1.2  1.1  3.5  3.0  1.3  2.0 
 
Additional primary sectoral TFP shocks (% per year): coal 2.7, oil 2.1, gas 1.7, mineral 
resources 1.0, agriculture and food 1.0, forestry 1.0. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing on World Bank and OECD projections. 
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Appendix Table A4: Assumed annual rates of growth in factor endowments and real GDP, 
and implied total factor productivity and real GDP per capita growth rates, from 2030 to 2050 

















USA  0.7 0.4 -0.1 2.9 2.7 1.5  2.0
Canada  0.3 -0.1 -0.6 2.7 2.6 1.4  2.3
EU27 and EFTA  -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 2.0 2.0 1.1  2.0
Russia  -0.6 -1.0 -1.6 2.8 3.2 1.2  3.8
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  0.7 0.8 0.6 3.1 3.5 1.0  2.8
Australia  0.6 0.3 -0.1 3.4 3.5 1.7  3.0
New Zealand  0.6 0.5 0.1 3.4 3.6 1.5  3.0
Japan  -0.3 -0.7 -1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3  1.9
Korea  0.2 0.3 0.3 4.7 4.7 1.8  4.4
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  0.3 0.1 -0.5 4.5 4.4 1.9  4.1
China  0.5 0.3 3.0 7.0 5.5 0.8  5.0
Indonesia   1.0 1.4 1.4 4.8 5.0 1.5  4.0
Malaysia  1.2 1.6 1.6 5.0 4.9 1.4  3.6
Thailand  0.5 0.2 0.2 4.4 4.9 1.6  4.4
Rest of East Asia  1.2 1.6 1.7 4.2 4.6 1.3  3.4
India  1.0 1.5 1.5 5.4 5.0 1.2  4.0
Rest of South Asia  1.6 2.2 2.1 5.0 4.9 1.2  3.3
Argentina  0.9 1.1 1.1 3.3 3.7 1.5  2.9
Brazil  1.0 0.9 0.9 3.5 3.7 1.5  2.8
Rest of Latin America  1.3 1.7 1.6 3.6 3.9 1.0  2.6
Middle East/Nth Africa  1.6 2.0 1.7 4.2 4.5 1.0  2.8
South Africa  0.5 0.9 0.2 3.1 3.5 1.4  3.1
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  2.0 2.6 2.0 3.6 4.4 1.0  2.4
High-income countries  0.2 0.1  -0.4 2.4  2.4 1.3 2.6
Developing countries  1.2 1.5  1.7 5.7  4.8 1.1 4.0
World  1.0 1.3  0.9 3.9  3.4 1.3 2.6
 
Additional primary sectoral TFP shocks (% per year):: coal 3.1, oil 2.8, gas 2.2, mineral 
resources 1.7, agriculture and food 1.3, forestry 2.0. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing on World Bank and OECD projections. 8 
 
Appendix Table A5: Endogenous international commodity price changes resulting from 
updating the baseline data from 2004 to 2030 and 2050 
 
(total percentage change relative to the aggregate for all products) 
 
 2030/2004  2050/2004 
Rice 0.0  -1.9 
Wheat 5.7  5.4 
Coarse grains  5.4  5.4 
Fruit & veg  5.5  5.2 
Oilseeds 4.9  5.0 
Sugar -2.7  -4.4 
Cotton 4.6  3.9 
Other crops  5.2  4.8 
Beef/sheep 0.2  -1.1 
Pork/chicken 0.4  -0.1 
Dairy -2.4  -4.9 
Agriculture & food  2.5  1.6 
Forestry 0.3  -1.4 
Coal -5.6  0.5 
Oil -1.9  -2.2 
Gas -2.7  -3.0 
Energy -2.4  -2.0 
Minerals nec  -1.3  3.0 
Fish and processed food  1.4  2.0 
Light manufacturing  -1.1  -1.3 
Heavy manufacturing  -1.5  -1.6 
Manufacturing -1.0  -1.1 
Utilities & construction  -0.8  -1.3 
Electricity, gas distribution  -3.0  -1.5 
Transport   -1.8  -2.6 
Other services  1.0  1.2 
Services 0.2  0.2 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
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Regions 2004  2030  2050 
USA  32.5 29.1 25.3
Canada  2.3 2.0 1.8
EU27 and EFTA  27.0 20.2 15.4
Russia  1.1 1.2 1.1
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  1.0 1.3 1.3
Australia  1.2 1.3 1.3
New Zealand  0.2 0.2 0.2
Japan  13.1 8.7 6.1
Korea  1.5 2.2 2.8
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1.8 2.5 3.1
China  4.4 11.3 17.2
Indonesia   0.5 0.8 1.1
Malaysia  0.3 0.6 0.8
Thailand  0.4 0.6 0.8
Rest of East Asia  0.6 0.8 1.0
India  1.7 3.3 4.5
Rest of South Asia  0.5 0.8 1.1
Argentina  0.8 0.9 1.0
Brazil  1.6 1.8 1.9
Rest of Latin America  3.8 4.8 5.2
Middle East/Nth Africa  2.9 4.2 5.2
South Africa  0.4 0.4 0.4
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  0.7 1.0 1.2
High-income countries  78.3 63.9 52.6 















primary Manuf  Services  Total 
USA  2  1 16 82  100 
Canada  2  5 18 75  100 
EU27 and EFTA  3  1 19 78  100 
Russia  8 16 15 62  100 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  10 12 17 62  100 
Australia  4  5 14 78  100 
New Zealand  8  2 16 74  100 
Japan  2  0 19 79  100 
Korea  3  0 28 68  100 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1  1 25 73  100 
China  12  7 33 48  100 
Indonesia   12 13 25 50  100 
Malaysia  2 15 49 33  100 
Thailand  10  3 32 55  100 
Rest of East Asia  12  7 29 51  100 
India  24  4 18 54  100 
Rest of South Asia  20  3 14 63  100 
Argentina  9  6 15 71  100 
Brazil  8  2 18 71  100 
Rest of Latin America  9  6 28 56  100 
Middle East/Nth Africa  6 26 12 56  100 
South Africa  3  3 21 73  100 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  22 23 11 44  100 
High-income countries  2  2 17 79  100 
Developing countries  10  8 24 57  100 
World  4  3 19 75  100 
 
 




primary Manuf  Services  Total 
USA  2  2 14 83  100 
Canada  2  8 14 76  100 
EU27 and EFTA  3  2 16 79  100 
Russia  6 22 12 61  100 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  8 13 16 63  100 
Australia  4  7 11 77  100 
New Zealand  9  3 14 74  100 
Japan  2  1 16 82  100 
Korea  2  1 28 69  100 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1  1 25 73  100 11 
 
China  6  5 44 45  100 
Indonesia   8 13 25 53  100 
Malaysia  1 13 51 35  100 
Thailand  8  4 32 57  100 
Rest of East Asia  9  9 30 53  100 
India  19  5 18 58  100 
Rest of South Asia  16  3 15 66  100 
Argentina  9  8 13 70  100 
Brazil  9  4 16 72  100 
Rest of Latin America  8  8 27 57  100 
Middle East/Nth Africa  5 25 13 56  100 
South Africa  4  6 17 73  100 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  19 23 12 45  100 
High-income countries  3  3 15 80  100 
Developing countries  8  8 28 56  100 
World  4  4 19 73  100 
 
(c)   2050 
Agric 
Other 
primary Manuf  Services  Total 
USA  2  2 11 84  100 
Canada  2 11 11 77  100 
EU27 and EFTA  3  4 14 80  100 
Russia  5 28  8 59  100 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  8 14 14 64  100 
Australia  4 9 9  77  100 
New Zealand  9  4 13 74  100 
Japan  2  1 11 86  100 
Korea  2  1 27 70  100 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1  2 24 74  100 
China  3  5 47 45  100 
Indonesia   6 13 25 56  100 
Malaysia  1 13 52 35  100 
Thailand  7  4 31 59  100 
Rest of East Asia  7 10 30 54  100 
India  17  5 18 61  100 
Rest of South Asia  13  4 15 68  100 
Argentina  8 10 12 70  100 
Brazil  11  5 13 72  100 
Rest of Latin America  7  9 26 59  100 
Middle East/Nth Africa  5 25 13 57  100 
South Africa  4  8 15 73  100 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  19 23 12 46  100 
High-income countries  3  4 12 81  100 
Developing countries  6  8 29 57  100 
World  4  6 18 72  100 12 
 




Regions 2004  2030  2050 
USA  12.7 13.9 15.0 
Canada  1.3 1.3 1.1 
EU27 and EFTA  21.2 18.0 15.7 
Russia  2.9 2.3 1.8 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  4.4 4.4 4.2 
Australia  1.6 1.9 2.1 
New Zealand  0.5 0.5 0.6 
Japan  5.0 3.6 3.2 
Korea  1.2 1.2 1.4 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  0.5 0.5 0.5 
China  12.2 11.5  8.9 
Indonesia   2.2 2.1 2.1 
Malaysia  0.2 0.2 0.2 
Thailand  0.9 1.0 1.1 
Rest of East Asia  1.5 1.3 1.3 
India  10.0 12.8 14.9 
Rest of South Asia  2.5 2.9 3.0 
Argentina  0.8 0.8 0.8 
Brazil  3.2 4.0 5.1 
Rest of Latin America  6.4 5.8 5.7 
Middle East/Nth Africa  3.7 4.1 4.4 
South Africa  0.4 0.6 0.6 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  4.5 5.1 6.1 
High-income countries  49.7 46.0 43.7 




























USA  40.7 31.4  27.3  0.3  0.3 
Canada  38.4 23.3  36.3  0.2  1.8 
EU27 and EFTA  34.1 24.4  40.9  0.3  0.4 
Russia  28.6 12.8  51.1  1.8  5.7 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  29.5 12.2  53.2  1.5  3.7 
Australia  34.9 24.9  38.2  0.6  1.4 
New Zealand  33.5 17.8  47.4  0.7  0.6 
Japan  36.7 22.5  40.5  0.2  0.1 
Korea  35.3 15.8  47.3  1.4  0.2 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  31.1 21.8  46.4  0.4  0.3 
China  39.7 11.1  43.4  3.3  2.5 
Indonesia   32.0 8.0  50.5  5.7 3.8 
Malaysia  36.8 11.8  45.8  1.1  4.6 
Thailand  21.7 8.9  63.9  4.1 1.3 
Rest of East Asia  30.4 11.5  50.4  4.7  2.9 
India  34.8 10.8  44.2  9.0  1.2 
Rest of South Asia  35.5 12.2  43.5  7.6  1.1 
Argentina  38.0 17.1  40.6  2.3  2.0 
Brazil  35.5 20.0  42.5  1.1  0.9 
Rest of Latin America  30.7 15.1  49.8  2.2  2.2 
Middle East/Nth Africa  22.4 11.1  56.7  0.6  9.2 
South Africa  31.5 17.8  49.4  0.4  1.0 
Rest SubSaharan Africa  31.9 9.0  49.5  2.6 7.0 
High-income countries  36.9 26.2  36.0  0.3  0.5 
Developing countries  32.9 13.7  47.7  2.8  2.8 
World  36.1 23.8  38.2  0.8  1.0 
 



















USA  39.6 28.8 30.1 0.6 1.0 
Canada  36.2 20.7 38.1 0.5 4.6 
EU27 and EFTA  32.2 22.3 43.7 0.6 1.2 
Russia  23.5 11.6 49.3 1.3 14.3 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  25.6 11.7 53.0 1.7 7.9 
Australia  32.3 21.8 40.9 0.9 4.0 
New Zealand  30.8 15.5 50.2 1.6 1.8 
Japan  34.7 20.2 44.5 0.3 0.2 
Korea  29.1 15.4 54.2 0.9 0.4 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  26.1 19.1 53.5 0.3 0.9 
China  29.5 10.7 54.8 1.4 3.6 
Indonesia   27.8 8.4 51.8 4.1 8.0 
Malaysia  32.2 12.7 46.1 0.7 8.3 
Thailand  18.5 9.1 66.8 3.2 2.4 
Rest of East Asia  26.6 11.7 52.1 3.7 5.8 
India  29.5 11.2 48.4 8.3 2.6 
Rest of South Asia  31.2 12.5 46.6 7.3 2.5 
Argentina  34.2 18.0 40.4 3.0 4.4 
Brazil  32 20.0 42.9 2.7 2.3 
Rest of Latin America  27.7 15.6 49.5 2.4 4.8 
Middle East/Nth Africa  19.5 10.8 51.3 1.2 17.2 
South Africa  29.1 17.1 49.3 1.2 3.4 
Rest SubSaharan Africa  27.9 9.0 44.0 5.3 13.8 
High-income countries  35.2 24.0  38.5  0.6  1.7 
Developing countries  27.8 13.0  51.4  2.6  5.3 
World  33.0 20.8  42.3  1.2  2.7 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing on World Bank and OECD projections. 15 
 














USA  38.1 27.0 32.3 0.8 1.8 
Canada  33.5 18.8 39.1 0.6 7.9 
EU27 and EFTA  29.9 20.7 45.7 1.0 2.6 
Russia  20.2 10.6 47.2 0.9 21.2 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  23.3 11.2 52.3 2.3 11.0 
Australia  29.5 19.8 42.7 1.2 6.8 
New Zealand  28.2 14.2 52.1 2.5 3.1 
Japan  33.2 18.2 47.3 0.6 0.6 
Korea  25.7 13.9 59.1 0.8 0.6 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  22.7 16.5 58.9 0.3 1.6 
China  24.2 10.0 61.5 0.6 3.7 
Indonesia   24.6 7.8 54.1 3.5 10.0 
Malaysia  29.5 11.8 48.2 0.6 9.9 
Thailand  16.4 8.6 69.3 2.6 3.1 
Rest of East Asia  23.8 11.4 53.5 3.5 7.8 
India  26.3 10.7 52.6 7.2 3.2 
Rest of South Asia  28.3 12.2 49.6 6.7 3.2 
Argentina  31.8 17.4 40.1 4.0 6.7 
Brazil  29.6 19.2 43.6 4.0 3.6 
Rest of Latin America  25.7 15.2 49.7 2.8 6.6 
Middle East/Nth Africa  17.5 10.2 50.0 1.7 20.6 
South Africa  26.4 15.9 49.5 2.0 6.1 
Rest SubSaharan Africa  25.6 8.8 41.5 6.9 17.2 
High-income countries  33.4 22.4  40.1  0.9  3.1 
Developing countries  24.4 12.0  54.9  2.4  6.3 
World  30.0 18.5  45.7  1.5  4.3 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation drawing on World Bank and OECD projections. 
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Appendix Table A10: Unskilled labour share of agricultural and non-agricultural GDP, 2004, 
2030 and 2050 
 
(%) 
 Agricultural  GDP  Non-agricultural GDP 
2004 2030  2050  2004  2030  2050 
USA  45.0 44.5 43.2 40.6  39.5 37.9 
Canada  42.3 42.1 39.8 38.3  36.0 33.4 
EU27 and EFTA  55.0 53.4 49.1 33.6  31.5 29.3 
Russia  51.4 57.5 65.4 26.7  21.3 17.9 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  52.5 54.3 51.7 27.0  23.0 20.9 
Australia  48.0 45.3 43.3 34.3  31.8 28.9 
New Zealand  56.2 55.1 52.5 31.6  28.5 25.7 
Japan  44.7 49.8 49.9 36.6  34.4 32.9 
Korea  39.9 46.2 45.4 35.2  28.8 25.3 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  49.4 51.5 50.7 30.9  25.8 22.5 
China  57.1 68.4 77.5 37.3  27.2 22.4 
Indonesia   42.5 42.6 39.8 30.5  26.4 23.6 
Malaysia  40.7 42.0 38.7 36.7  32.0 29.5 
Thailand  39.3 41.9 43.6 19.8  16.6 14.5 
Rest of East Asia  44.9 43.1 39.2 28.4  25.0 22.7 
India  40.3 38.7 38.3 33.0  27.3 23.8 
Rest of South Asia  35.3 32.0 29.5 35.6  31.0 28.1 
Argentina  46.9 46.0 39.6 37.1  33.1 31.1 
Brazil  25.3 25.1 24.7 36.5  32.8 30.2 
Rest of Latin America  45.7 42.8 38.2 29.1  26.5 24.8 
Middle East/Nth Africa  55.1 51.9 45.7 20.2  17.7 16.2 
South Africa  35.2 30.3 25.2 31.3  29.0 26.5 
Rest SubSaharan Africa  68.0 57.3 49.9 22.0  21.0 19.9 
High-income countries      
Developing countries      
World      
 
Source: Authors’ compilation from GTAP model projections 17 
 
Appendix Table A11: Agriculture’s share of total employment of unskilled labour, 2004, 
2030 and 2050 
 
(%) 
  2004  2030  2050 
USA  1.8 2.2  2.7 
Canada  2.4 2.8  2.5 
EU27 and EFTA  4.1 4.9  5.4 
Russia  13.6 14.8  15.7 
Rest E. Europe/C. Asia  17.8 17.6  17.1 
Australia  5.4 6.0  6.2 
New Zealand  13.1 15.6  17.5 
Japan  1.9 2.4  2.9 
Korea  3.3 3.4  3.3 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  2.0 2.0  1.9 
China  17.4 13.3  10.4 
Indonesia   16.5 12.6  10.3 
Malaysia  2.5 1.7  1.3 
Thailand  17.7 17.3  17.7 
Rest of East Asia  18.1 13.8  11.2 
India  28.0 25.0  24.9 
Rest of South Asia  20.3 16.6  13.8 
Argentina  11.3 11.5  10.5 
Brazil  5.9 7.3  8.8 
Rest of Latin America  14.0 11.6 9.8 
Middle East/Nth Africa  15.0 13.9  12.1 
South Africa  3.6 4.2  4.0 
Rest SubSaharan Africa  46.0 39.0  36.9 
High-income countries  3.2 3.8  4.2 
Developing countries  14.8 12.9  11.6 
World  5.2 6.1  6.5 
 




Table 1: Exogenous Yield Shocks (%) attributed to Climate Change in 2030, by region and 
sector 
Regions 








USA -3  2  3  2  2  -3  2 
Canada -3  7  -10  2  10  -3  2 
EU27 and EFTA  7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Russia 7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  7  7  -5  7  7  7  7 
Australia -3  7  -5  -3  2  -3  7 
New Zealand  7  7  -5  7  2  7  7 
Japan 9  4  0  4  9  9  4 
Korea 12  12  5  12  12  12  12 
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan 12 12  5  -3  12  12 12 
China 0  2  -10  -8  0  0  -8 
Indonesia   -3  -3  -10  7  -3  -3  -3 
Malaysia -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Thailand -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Rest of East Asia  -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
India -5  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Rest of South Asia  -5  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Argentina -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Brazil -3  -3  -10  -3  2  -3  -3 
Rest of Latin America  -3  -3  -5  -3  -3  -3  -3 
Middle East/Nth Africa  2  2  -5  2  2  2  2 
South Africa  -8  -8  -20  -8  -8  -8  -8 
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -3  -3  -10  -3  -3  -3  -3 
 
Source: Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010) 
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Table 2: Effects of economic growth, and of crop yield changes due to climate change, on 























USA  103.4  111.8 112.3 112.3 122.4 123.4 123.3
Canada  108.3  119.0 120.1 120.0 130.0 133.8 133.6
EU27 and EFTA  94.0  100.9 101.7 101.7 111.1 115.2 115.0
Russia  89.2  89.6 90.0 90.0 90.5 92.0 92.0
Rest of EE/C Asia  100.2  100.0 101.2 101.1 106.6 111.6 111.1
Australia  137.9  152.1 153.4 153.7 167.0 172.5 173.1
New Zealand  161.2  171.9 173.2 173.5 186.3 191.9 192.3
Japan  82.5  83.3 83.7 83.7 84.6 85.8 85.8
Korea  81.4  79.5 81.8 81.7 78.3 82.7 82.6
HK/Sing/Taiwan  65.9  65.2 65.7 65.4 65.5 64.7 64.6
China  97.2  90.3 89.4 89.3 85.8 82.8 82.6
Indonesia   94.7  84.2 83.9 84.0 79.0 82.7 82.8
Malaysia  60.3  45.3 44.7 44.8 39.1 37.7 38.0
Thailand  111.9  97.5 96.8 96.8 88.5 86.7 86.6
Rest of East Asia  99.5  89.5 88.8 88.8 86.0 84.2 84.1
India  101.2  95.1 94.3 94.3 87.5 85.3 85.5
Rest of Sth. Asia  95.7  86.1 85.4 85.5 78.8 77.3 77.5
Argentina  142  145.8 144.1 143.9 154.9 153.1 151.9
Brazil  122.5  132.0 131.5 131.8 144.1 143.9 144.3
Rest of L America  101.7  94.9 94.3 94.2 93.7 91.5 91.4
M. East/N. Africa  83.6  82.8 83.1 82.7 83.1 83.9 83.3
South Africa  106.9  115.4 114.5 114.6 129.0 125.8 125.7
Rest of SS Africa  102.2  97.2 96.1 95.8 96.7 93.5 93.1
High-income 
countries 96.1  111.8 112.4 112.3 126.9 129.7 129.3
Developing 




Source: Authors’ simulations, assuming the crop productivity shocks of climate change are 
those shown in Table 1 by 2030 and twice those by 2050. 20 
 
Table 3: Effects of crop productivity shocks due to climate change on agricultural production, 
consumption and trade, 2030 and 2050  
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA  0.3 0.4 -0.1 -1.2 2.5 -0.6
Canada  0.2 1.1 0.2 -1.8 3.5 0.5
EU27 and EFTA  -0.3 1.1 0.3 -0.5 3.3 -0.7
Russia  -0.2 0.7 0.2 -0.6 9.1 -1.5
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -0.6 1.6 0.3 -0.7 12.1 -1.8
Australia  0.5 0.7 -0.1 -1.7 2.2 1.0
New Zealand  0.1 1.2 0.4 -1.5 2.1 -0.4
Japan  -0.4 0.7 0.2 0.1 13.6 -0.9
Korea  -3.5 4.3 1.4 0.1 43.8 -5.8
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  0.3 1.2 0.4 -1.9 10.9 0.7
China  4.3 -1.8 -0.8 -4.4 -21.1 6.2
Indonesia   1.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 8.3 1.7
Malaysia  1.0 -1.1 0.4 -0.1 -1.1 1.6
Thailand  2.2 -1.5 -0.7 -1.8 -1.6 3.7
Rest of East Asia  1.6 -1.3 -0.5 -0.7 -2.9 3.3
India  3.2 -1.7 -0.9 -2.0 -6.7 12.7
Rest of South Asia  1.2 -1.1 -0.3 -0.4 -3.7 4.1
Argentina  0.9 -1.8 -0.6 0.4 -3.9 1.5
Brazil  0.5 -0.7 -0.4 0.0 -1.7 0.6
Rest of Latin America  0.9 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -4.5 2.2
Middle East/Nth Africa  -0.1 0.6 0.2 -0.4 5.1 -0.3
South Africa  0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -1.1 -3.1 1.7
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5 -1.7 -0.6 -1.3 -6.6 2.6
High-income countries  -0.1 0.8 0.4 -0.8 1.8 -0.8
Developing countries  2.3 -1.1 -0.5 -2.1 -2.6 3.4
World  1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.6 0.9 1.521 
 
Table 3 (continued): Effects of crop productivity shocks due to climate change on agricultural 
production, consumption and trade, 2030 and 2050 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA  3.0 -0.8 -1.6 -5.6 2.8 3.6
Canada  1.6 3.0 0.2 -7.2 9.5 2.8
EU27 and EFTA  0.0 4.8 1.0 -5.3 14.2 -0.4
Russia  0.4 2.2 0.5 -3.8 31.9 -0.9
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  0.2 4.9 0.2 -5.7 30.5 0.0
Australia  1.8 3.1 -0.2 -6.5 7.8 3.4
New Zealand  1.1 3.8 0.8 -6.2 7.1 0.9
Japan  -0.2 2.6 1.1 -3.0 30.1 0.5
Korea  -4.1 8.7 2.9 -5.5 101.5 -5.2
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1.4 -0.5 0.7 -2.2 1.4 2.7
China  12.9 -5.2 -1.8 -11.1 -40.3 17.1
Indonesia   -5.3 7.3 2.4 -1.3 116.3 -14.5
Malasya  2.5 -2.0 1.8 -0.7 0.5 4.2
Thailand  4.9 -2.9 -0.9 -3.4 2.9 10.1
Rest of East Asia  4.0 -2.9 -0.8 -1.9 -3.4 7.9
India  6.0 -4.1 -1.7 -2.5 -4.2 14.8
Rest of South Asia  2.8 -2.4 -0.5 -0.7 -7.1 6.2
Argentina  3.7 -4.1 -3.0 -1.6 -5.7 4.9
Brazil  2.1 -1.5 -1.3 -1.6 -1.7 2.4
Rest of Latin America  5.3 -3.5 -1.1 -4.8 -10.6 11.1
Middle East/Nth Africa  0.5 1.5 0.5 -2.5 12.4 0.3
South Africa  5.1 -5.5 -3.2 -9.2 -8.7 6.5
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  9.2 -5.1 -1.8 -5.4 -16.4 10.2
High-income countries  1.2 2.6 0.4 -5.4 7.2 0.4
Developing countries  6.6 -3.0 -1.1 -5.6 -3.2 9.0
World  4.5 -0.8 -0.6 -5.5 5.1 6.6
 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations, assuming that climate change involves twice the crop 




Table 4: Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses, 2030 and 2050 
 
(2004 US$ million, deviation from baseline in projected year) 
(c) 2030 















as % of 
Income 
USA  86 912 -265 732 0.00
Canada  114 43 -97 61 0.00
EU27 and EFTA  804 505 -1639 -330 0.00
Russia  183 -186 -65 -67 -0.01
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  612 84 194 889 0.07
Australia  8 341 -30 319 0.03
New Zealand  17 49 1 68 0.04
Japan  189 -94 -265 -171 0.00
Korea  857 115 -909 63 0.00
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  33 46 -5 75 0.01
China  -7656 -1805 -175 -9636 -0.21
Indonesia   -280 -5 13 -272 -0.05
Malaysia  -62 -34 20 -76 -0.02
Thailand  -354 180 -99 -274 -0.08
Rest of East Asia  -418 -38 -1 -456 -0.12
India  -5894 -294 425 -5764 -0.34
Rest of South Asia  -946 -167 93 -1021 -0.24
Argentina  -173 200 -132 -106 -0.04
Brazil  -304 226 17 -61 -0.01
Rest of Latin America  -952 18 221 -713 -0.03
Middle East/Nth Africa  201 -282 22 -59 0.00
South Africa  -84 116 -12 20 0.01
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -1468 74 25 -1370 -0.21
High-income countries  2013 1654 -2166 1501 0.00
Developing countries  -17500 -1652 -497 -19649 -0.11
World  -15487 2 -2663 -18148 -0.03
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Table 4 (continued): Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses, 2030 
and 2050  
 
(2004 US$ million, deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 
(d) 2050  















as % of 
Income 
USA  -4838 9300 1125 5587 0.03
Canada  434 800 -552 682 0.04
EU27 and EFTA  1723 5146 -8512 -1643 -0.01
Russia  239 -1110 -184 -1055 -0.08
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  2104 885 1302 4292 0.24
Australia  226 2961 -75 3112 0.19
New Zealand  66 455 21 543 0.24
Japan  199 -588 -1116 -1505 -0.03
Korea  2170 590 -2577 183 0.01
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -129 344 -65 150 0.01
China  -39341 -16630 -569 -56540 -0.68
Indonesia   6143 172 -464 5851 0.56
Malaysia  -226 32 149 -45 -0.01
Thailand  -1417 663 -379 -1133 -0.19
Rest of East Asia  -1445 -417 -28 -1890 -0.28
India  -23668 -2305 1309 -24664 -0.82
Rest of South Asia  -3487 -973 467 -3993 -0.53
Argentina  -716 1186 -454 17 0.00
Brazil  -1346 1929 1 585 0.04
Rest of Latin America  -5424 -1213 612 -6026 -0.15
Middle East/Nth Africa  841 -2010 219 -951 -0.03
South Africa  -624 1248 -74 551 0.11
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -7854 -431 207 -8078 -0.75
High-income countries  153 17849 -7990 10012 0.02
Developing countries  -76523 -17815 -1647 -95986 -0.32
World  -76370 34 -9638 -85974 -0.11
 
Source: authors’ simulations 24 
 
Table 5: Effects on agricultural production, consumption and trade of crop productivity losses 
and decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050 
 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 



















USA  0.4 0.4 0.0 -1.2 2.4 -0.7
Canada  0.3 1.0 0.2 -1.8 3.4 0.7
EU27 and EFTA  -0.1 1.1 0.3 -0.7 3.5 -0.6
Russia  0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.7 9.0 -1.6
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  -0.4 1.4 0.3 -0.8 10.9 -1.7
Australia  0.6 0.9 -0.1 -2.0 2.7 0.9
New Zealand  0.4 1.2 0.3 -1.8 2.4 -0.1
Japan  -0.3 0.7 0.3 -0.1 13.6 -0.8
Korea  -3.0 3.5 0.8 0.3 41.7 -5.9
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  0.6 0.2 -0.2 -1.5 9.3 0.5
China  4.8 -2.8 -1.7 -4.0 -23.2 6.1
Indonesia   1.3 -1.2 -1.0 0.0 8.4 0.7
Malaysia  1.0 -1.6 -0.3 0.6 0.2 0.7
Thailand  2.5 -1.5 -0.7 -2.0 -1.6 4.0
Rest of East Asia  1.9 -2.0 -1.2 -0.3 -3.1 3.0
India  3.3 -2.3 -1.5 -1.5 -8.7 10.3
Rest of South Asia  1.4 -1.7 -1.0 0.1 -2.8 2.7
Argentina  1.1 -1.8 -0.5 0.3 -4.3 1.6
Brazil  0.7 -1.2 -1.1 0.5 -1.6 -0.1
Rest of Latin America  1.2 -1.7 -1.0 0.1 -5.4 2.1
Middle East/Nth Africa  0.4 -0.6 -0.5 0.0 2.5 0.2
South Africa  1.1 -1.2 -0.5 -1.3 -3.1 1.5
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  3.0 -2.9 -1.5 -0.6 -8.7 2.9
High-income countries  0.1 0.8 0.4 -0.9 1.6 -0.7
Developing countries  2.6 -1.9 -1.2 -1.6 -3.5 3.0
World  1.4 -0.6 -0.5 -1.4 0.6 1.425 
 
Table 5 (continued): Effects of on agricultural production, consumption and trade of crop 
productivity losses and decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050 
 
(percent deviation from baseline in projected year) 
 




















USA  3.1 -0.6 -1.3 -5.1 2.5 2.9
Canada  1.7 3.0 0.2 -6.8 9.2 2.8
EU27 and EFTA  0.2 4.5 1.0 -4.9 13.5 -0.3
Russia  0.6 1.9 0.3 -3.7 29.9 -1.5
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  0.4 4.5 0.3 -5.3 27.0 -0.4
Australia  1.8 3.8 0.2 -6.8 9.0 2.9
New Zealand  1.4 3.8 0.5 -6.4 7.3 1.6
Japan  -0.1 2.5 1.2 -2.9 28.1  0.5
Korea  -3.9 8.6 3.0 -5.5 98.8 -4.9
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  1.7 -0.5 0.9 -2.3 0.9 3.1
China  13.5 -7.1 -3.5 -9.8 -43.6  16.5
Indonesia   -5.3 6.0 1.0 0.1 117.0 -16.1
Malaysia  2.2 -2.8 0.2 0.7 2.6 2.1
Thailand  5.3 -2.9 -0.9 -3.6 2.5  10.4
Rest of East Asia  4.4 -4.2 -2.1 -1.0 -4.1  7.1
India  6.1 -4.9 -2.7 -1.8 -10.1  12.1
Rest of South Asia  3.2 -3.4 -1.8 0.0 -6.1  4.0
Argentina  3.7 -4.1 -2.2 -1.2 -7.0  5.0
Brazil  2.3 -2.4 -2.6 -0.5 -2.0  0.8
Rest of Latin America  5.7 -4.9 -2.5 -3.6 -12.3  10.1
Middle East/Nth Africa  1.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.6 7.3 0.3
South Africa  5.1 -5.5 -3.0 -8.4 -9.2  5.4
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  9.2 -6.8 -3.2 -3.9 -19.3  9.5
High-income countries  1.3 2.5 0.6 -5.1 6.4 0.3
Developing countries  7.0 -4.3 -2.3 -4.6 -4.8  7.9
World  4.7 -1.6 -1.4 -4.7 4.1 5.8
 
Source: authors’ simulations 26 
 
Table 6: Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses and decreases in 
unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050   
 




















USA  87 -163 -858 -933 -0.01
Canada  114 -246 -215 -347 -0.03
EU27 and EFTA  803 -386 -4143 -3726 -0.02
Russia  183 -1826 -627 -2270 -0.23
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  609 -477 98 230 0.02
Australia  8 -1067 -167 -1225 -0.11
New Zealand  17 57 -12 62 0.04
Japan  189 193 -430 -48 0.00
Korea  -10309 1297 -2758 -11771 -0.79
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -8852 1161 -490 -8180 -0.69
China  -42711 3822 -7855 -46745 -1.03
Indonesia   -4841 -299 -196 -5335 -0.91
Malaysia  -2853 165 -109 -2797 -0.92
Thailand  -354 448 -79 15 0.00
Rest of East Asia  -3172 -66 -387 -3624 -0.92
India  -18420 1628 -814 -17606 -1.05
Rest of South Asia  -4511 262 -213 -4462 -1.04
Argentina  -173 112 -135 -196 -0.08
Brazil  -9290 201 -1163 -10253 -0.97
Rest of Latin America  -15267 -507 -6941 -22716 -0.89
Middle East/Nth Africa  -9935 -3227 -1148 -14310 -0.73
South Africa  -84 -233 -60 -377 -0.11
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -6260 -858 -430 -7547 -1.16
High-income countries  2010 -3914 -6353 -8257 -0.02
Developing countries  -137031 3907 -22779 -155903 -0.88
World  -135022 -7 -29131 -164160 -0.28
 
Source: authors’ simulations 
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Table 6 (continued): Effects on national economic welfare of crop productivity losses and 
decreases in unskilled labour productivity, 2030 and 2050  
 


















as % of 
Income 
USA  -4766 -149 -659 -5574 -0.03
Canada  429 -1644 -930 -2146 -0.12
EU27 and EFTA  1684 -4303 -15320 -17938 -0.10
Russia  237 -8213 -1594 -9570 -0.71
Rest of Europe/C. Asia  2068 -1561 879 1387 0.08
Australia  223 -4234 -650 -4662 -0.28
New Zealand  65 389 -31 423 0.19
Japan  197 -898 -1549 -2250 -0.04
Korea  2162 4066 -2849 3378 0.13
HongKong/Sing/Taiwan  -128 1992 49 1913 0.10
China  -149143 18491 -23808 -154460 -1.85
Indonesia   -8367 -540 -1082 -9989 -0.96
Malaysia  -9413 1160 -297 -8549 -1.58
Thailand  -1410 1959 -329 220 0.04
Rest of East Asia  -9992 -320 -1182 -11495 -1.71
India  -61146 7837 -1189 -54499 -1.82
Rest of South Asia  -14699 1269 -485 -13915 -1.85
Argentina  -708 756 -487 -438 -0.12
Brazil  -26800 952 -3164 -29013 -1.83
Rest of Latin America  -46611 -3455 -20528 -70594 -1.81
Middle East/Nth Africa  -29479 -9842 -3349 -42670 -1.34
South Africa  -609 -632 -269 -1510 -0.30
Rest Sub-Saharan Africa  -21666 -3144 -1232 -26042 -2.43
High-income countries  138 -20613 -19855 -40329 -0.08
Developing countries  -378011 20548 -60200 -417663 -1.38
World  -377873 -64 -80055 -457992 -0.57
 
Source: authors’ simulations 
 